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Skype virus – an irritating issue related to this widely-used communication toolQuestions about Skype virus.12/01/181.07/07/171.24/11/161.15/05/161Skype virus is a group of malicious programs and phishing scams that have been targeting users of this widely-spread application. One of the first cyber threats was Skype worm w32/Ramex.A which was detected in 2007. However, it seems that the term “Skype virus 2018” will continue appearing in users' searches. The latest its versions are reported as Baidu virus.
Step 1: Reboot your computer to Safe Mode with NetworkingWindows 7 / Vista / XP.Click Start → Shutdown → Restart → OK.When your computer becomes active, start pressing F8 multiple times until you see the Advanced Boot Options window.Select Safe Mode with Networking from the listWindows 10 / Windows 8.Press the Power button at the Windows login screen. Now press and hold Shift, which is on your keyboard, and click Restart.Now select Troubleshoot → Advanced options → Startup Settings and finally press Restart.Once your computer becomes active, select Enable Safe Mode with Networking in Startup Settings window. Step 1: Reboot your computer to Safe Mode with Command PromptWindows 7 / Vista / XP.Click Start → Shutdown → Restart → OK.When your computer becomes active, start pressing F8 multiple times until you see the Advanced Boot Options window.Select Command Prompt from the listWindows 10 / Windows 8.Press the Power button at the Windows login screen. Now press and hold Shift, which is on your keyboard, and click Restart.Now select Troubleshoot → Advanced options → Startup Settings and finally press Restart.Once your computer becomes active, select Enable Safe Mode with Command Prompt in Startup Settings window. Jake Doevan- Computer technology expertIf this free removal guide helped you and you are satisfied with our service, please consider making a donation to keep this service alive. Even a smallest amount will be appreciated.References.
David Perry. Bitcoin Magazine. Source of news, insight, reviews, guides, and price analysis on bitcoin, ethereum, blockchain technology, cryptocurrencies, the darkweb, and other decentralized technologies. Treye Green. International Business Times.
Business, Technology, Politics. Tom Warren. Daily and World News. Rene Millman.
Ana. Anmol Sachdeva.
The Tech Portal. Technology News and Reviews. Jenny Kirkham. Southport News, Southport FC, Sport nad What's On.
Skype Support. The official website.
.Security Response Sality: Story of a Peer- to-Peer Viral NetworkNicolas FallierePrincipal Software EngineerVersion 1.0 (July 2011)Executive SummaryW32.Sality is a file infector that spreads by infecting executable files andContentsby replicating itself across network shares. Infected hosts join a peer-Executive Summary. 1to-peer network used to propagate malware on the compromised com-Timeline. Typically, those additional programs will be used to relay spam,Architecture. 3proxy communications, steal private information, infect Web serversGoing peer-to-peer.Terkadang ekstensi file ini dapat juga digunakan untuk menyamarkan file rahasia dengan sederhana, yaitu dengan cara mengubah ekstensi file dan untuk lebih. Ulah usil virus terkadang juga tidak mengizinkan anda untuk mengakses Folder Option, sehingga anda perlu memperbaikinya. Berikut adalah.
Cara Menghilangkan Virus Shortcut. Dan masih banyak sekali jenis virus yang tak kalah menjengkelkan lainya, nah satulagi ada jenis virus PIF starter atau yang.7.or achieve distributed computing tasks, such as password cracking.Review of the V3 network. 11Review of the V4 network. 14The combination of file infection mechanism and the fully de-Metrics and Estimations. 15 centralized peer-to-peer network, along with other anti-secu-Conclusion. 18 rity measures, make Sality one of the most effective and re-Annex A. 19 silient malware in today’s threat landscape.Estimations showAnnex B.
20 that hundreds of thousands of machines are infected by Sality.This paper will give an overview of Sality and briefly describe the archi-tecture of the malware. The core of this paper focuses on the peer-to-peer characteristics of Sality, and examines its strengths. Finally, I will describe current trends and metrics for Sality.Timeline2003-2004: Early versionsThe first public occurrence of Sality was recorded in June 2003. In theinitial versions, Sality infected executables by pre-pending its UPX-packed code to the host.The payload consisted of an informationstealing routine, to collect user-input data (via a keylogger DLL), pass-words stored in the registry and dial-up connection settings. The sto-len data was then emailed to the attacker, using various SMTP serverslocated in Russia. An example of such an email can be seen in Figure 1.
Sality: Story of a peer-to-peer viral networkSecurity ResponseFigure 1Exfiltration mail sent by Sality v2.93Page 2. Sality: Story of a peer-to-peer viral networkSecurity ResponseA few interesting elements are found in these early versions of the virus.First, the author did not adopt thequiet, stay-under-the-radar approach many malware creators have nowadays. Second, the curious reader askingwhere the name “Sality” originated from now has the answer: it is derived from “Salavat City”, a Russian townfrom which the author may originate. This threat bears a couple of other names, also related to strings foundinside the payload: “Kuku” (which means Hide-and-Seek in Russian), or “Sector” (the nickname of the author).The simplicity of the early versions is expressed in at least three different areas.The file infector is basic compared to more advanced viruses. The virus and its payload form a whole entity.The author has no easy way to update it. The exfiltration method is also very basic, as the email addresses are hardcoded in the malware.2004-2008: Improving their creationBetween 2004 and 2008, the authors worked a lot to improve their creation. Detailing the many variants thatappeared during this period of time is not in the scope of this paper.More generally, however, theFigure 2infection technique changed asSality v3.09 contacting a C&C server (now sink-holed)the virus became polymorphicwith entry-point obscuringtechniques - making it moredifficult to detect and remedi-ate.
The payload was separatedfrom the virus code, as the viruswould download additionalmalware referenced by URLshardcoded in the virus body.Version 3.09, active in 2006, isa good example of that change.It includes anti-security software routines to block or disable a few firewalls, utilities, or anti-virus programs. Itcontacts a HTTP server (www.h3ns1k.info, www.g1ikdcvns3sdsal.info, or www.f5ds1jkkk4d.info), which returnsan encoded list of malware to be executed. The author also decided to be more quiet, though a few references to“kuku” remain, such as in the user-agent, “KUKU v3.09 exp” in this case.2008-2011: Better distribution schemeSometime in 2008, maybe late 2007, the author decided to fix a major weakness in the distribution scheme: thehardcoded URLs to the payload.
Such URLs can be easily blocked, the immediate result being that newly infectedhosts are instantly neutralized, unable to download the additional malware.The solution chosen was the addition of a peer-to-peer component, which will be studied in detail in upcomingsections.ArchitectureThis section describes the general architecture of recent variants of Sality (2008 and later.) All components aresemi-independent and run in separate threads. The injectorSality injects all running processes with a copy of its code, except for those belonging to the “system”, “local ser-vice” and “network service” accounts. If the process is privileged, Sality will try to grant itself Debug privileges,and try to inject it once more.Sality: Story of a peer-to-peer viral networkSecurity ResponseIf an instance of Sality is killed or terminated, voluntarily or not, one of the injected processes will take over. Toavoid multiple injections of the same process, per-process mutexes named “M” are cre-ated ( being the decimal representation of the Process ID). A large number of such mutexes on a runningsystem is good indication that it might be infected by the virus, as shown in Figure 3.Figure 3Mutexes on a computer compromised by Sality The protectorThis component is used to protect Sality from various security software or tools.First, in order to prevent Safeboot mode, Sality deletes registry subkeys and values located in HKEY CUR-RENT USERSystemCurrentControlSetControlSafeBoot and HKEY LOCAL MACHINESys-temCurrentControlSetControlSafeBoot.Many antivirus and security services are stopped and disabled.
Earlier versions of Sality were even more aggres-sive and deleted these services. The list of affected services can be found in Annex A.Sality also drops a kernel driver responsible for several tasks.This driver is dropped under a pseudo-randomname in the%System%drivers folder. A service is created to start it on-demand. The service name seemssteady across variants, “amsint32”.This driver serves three different purposes.
It acts as a process killer: Sality continuously scans the processes of a compromised computer. If a name matches one of the names stored in a hard-coded list of well-known security processes (see Annex A), this process is terminated. In order to bypass potential security measures, the process will be killed by the driver, in kernel mode.
It acts as a packet filter: the driver registers one of its routine as an IPFilter Callback routine, by sending an IOCTLPFSETEXTENSIONPOINTER control request to the IPFilter driver. (This callback can be used to implement firewall software in Windows XP/2003/2000, but is no longer available on Vista and above.) The callback set by Sality will drop packets if they contain string patterns of security vendor websites. The com- plete list can be found in Annex A.In effect, a customer using Windows XP would not be able to browse the Symantec.com website, for instance. Sality: Story of a peer-to-peer viral networkSecurity Response. The driver also has the possibility to block incoming and outgoing traffic to SMTP servers.
This feature can be enabled by the user-mode component of Sality, upon reception of a special order sent by the botmaster. Later variants can no longer use this feature, though the code implementation remains.The infectorThe infector component of Sality has the responsibility to propagate the virus. Several areas are candidates forinfection. Files referenced under the HKEY CURRENT USERSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsShellNoRoam MUICache registry key are infected. This key contains the applications’ “Common names” used by Explorer when grouping buttons in the Task bar.
A side-effect of this is that the MUICache entry is a great repository (partial though) of applications installed on a machine. Files referenced under the classic registry Run keys, HKEY CURRENT USERSoftwareMicrosoft WindowsCurrentVersionRun and HKEY LOCAL MACHINESOFTWAREMicrosoftWindows CurrentVersionRun are also infected.
All files on all mapped drives, from B: to Z:, are enumerated and potentially infected.Only executables having an “.exe” or “.scr” (screensaver) extensions are infected. Root folders of drives other than the Windows partition are infected: Sality will drop an infected copy of the Windows Calculator or the Minesweeper game, and will also create or modify the autorun.inf in order to try to run this file automatically when the drive is mounted. This dropped copy of Sality will have a random name with a “.exe”, “.cmd” or “.pif” extension. In practice, USB flash drives and external hard-drives can be infected. When such a file is executed, the host (Calculator or Minesweeper) will not be run, but an Explorer window showing the root of the current drive, will be shown instead. Finally, network resources are enumerated and all executable files found are candidates for infection.If a file targeted for infection belongs to a security software application (see Annex A), Sality will instead attemptto damage the file by overwriting the entry-point instructions with the bytes “CC C3 CC C3 CC C3 CC C3” (re-peated sequence of “int 3”, “ret” instructions). If this fails, then Sality will simply attempt to delete the file.Therecursive directory infection routine also searches and deletes files having a “.vdb” or “.avc” extension, respec-tively used by Symantec Antivirus and Kaspersky Antivirus virus definitions.
These extensions may also be usedby other programs.Finally, note that all infections routines are disabled if the peerlist (as defined later) is empty. This behavior iscoherent with the current distribution scheme, as it there is little value in infecting files that would be unable toconnect to the P2P network to download and retrieve additional malware.Sality employs polymorphic and entry-point obscuring (EPO) techniques to infect files. The entry-point address of the host is unchanged.
The code at the entry-point is changed, and replaced by a variable stub, generated by Sality polymorphic code generator (dubbed “Simple Poly Engine v1.1a (c) Sector”).This stub jumps to the main virus body, appended to the last section of the host file. The initial code of this body is also polymorphic and contains junk instructions to thwart emulation strategies used by anti-virus.This stub eventually decrypts and executes a secondary region, which is the loader itself. The loader is run in a separate thread in the infected process. Its role is to load and execute Sality itself (hereby referred to as payload).
If another copy of Sality is running on the system, it will wait. Meanwhile, the original entry-point code (OEP) of the host is restored and the host is executed. A secondary strategy (as used by files dropped at the root as described above), consists in opening an Explorer window.Figure 4 illustrates the virus structure and execution flow.In order to synchronize its different instances and to prevent multiple runs of the payload, Sality creates a mutexnamed “uxJLpe1m”, which is unique across variants. The presence of this mutex on a system is very strong indi-cation that it is infected by Sality.Likewise, creating this mutex beforehand is a simple and efficient inoculationmethod, which should prevent a machine from getting infected in the first place.Page 5. Sality: Story of a peer-to-peer viral networkSecurity ResponseFigure 4Execution flow of an infected file The downloaderThis component is responsible for downloading and executing additional malware pointed to by URLs retrievedby the peer-to-peer component.Files downloaded are usually encrypted by RC4, using a key hardcoded in the virus body.
Encryption details varybased on the network version. Typically, the key used to initialize the s-box is “kukutrusted!” in older versions, or“GdiPlus.dll” in newer versions.So far, the distributed malware have the same “code signature” as Sality itself. It seems reasonable to assumethey are written by the same gang, or at least share a significant portion of code.These malware are somehowmore traditional than Sality, as they usually communicate with and report to central C&C servers, located aroundthe world. The following is a list of malware programs distributed in the last year. Spam generators and spam relays are by far the most popular programs.
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The spam usually relates to Russian casinos or online pharmacies. HTTP proxies to relay traffic.
They can be used to mask shady operations and achieve anonymity. Information stealers, such as passwords and credentials locally stored on compromised computers, as well as Web credentials via Internet Explorer injection.Website infector. This malware sniffs and searches FTP credentials. It then connects to these machines and infects web-related HTML files: infection can be a simple IFRAME insertion, pointing to a third-party domain, or complex server-side scripts. The end-goal can range from drive-by download to install malware on users visiting these Web pages, to advertisement delivery. Distributed cracker.In February 2011, Sality operators pushed a malware designed to search SIP servers and crack VoIP accounts in a distributed fashion. See the blog “A Distributed Cracker for VoIP” for more details.“Experimental malware”.
An example includes automatic enrollment to a Facebook app (using previously sto- len Facebook credentials), or potential manipulation of Google Auto-Complete, as described in the blog “New Malware can Automatically Register Facebook Applications.”Page 6.7. Sality: Story of a peer-to-peer viral networkSecurity ResponseFigure 5 illustrates the geographic localization of Command & Control servers used by the additional malware, asof July 2011.Figure 5Geographic localization of Command & Control servers The peer-to-peer componentThese modules and sub-modules are responsible for the distribution of payload URLs and/or malware to infectedhosts.
They are described in detail in the following section.Going peer-to-peer The peerlistExecutable files infected by Sality join a peer-to-peer network composed of other compromised computers. Thenetwork is decentralized: there is no central authority and peers are theoretically equipotent. Initial contact withthe network is done via a bootstrap list of peers, carried around by infected files.This list contains the coordi-nates (public address, port) of a number of peers. In all variants examined, the maximum number of coordinateswas set to 1000.The first time Sality is run, a copy of the bootstrap list is dumped on the compromised computer. This local listwill be constantly updated over time, as peers are added or removed. This local list also contains extra informa-tion about peers, such as last contact time, goodcount and PeerID.The goodcount is an integer value that indicates the value of a peer.When a client tries to reach a peer of itspeerlist, its goodcount is adjusted based on the other peer’s response: if the peer was reached and respondedaccording to the protocol format, the goodcount is incremented.
Otherwise, it is decremented.Peers with a badgoodcount are discarded from the peerlist. It is important to realize that goodcounts are neither exchanged overthe P2P network nor stored in bootstrap lists.
They are specific to a given client’s peerlist.Page 7. 8.Sality: Story of a peer-to-peer viral networkSecurity ResponseFigure 6Illustration of the P2P distribution schemeWhen Sality infects a file, the local list is embedded in the infected file, in effect, becoming its bootstraplist.It is to be understood that peers in the peerlist are, ideally, peers directly reachable by other peers - later definedas super peers. In the remainder of this document, peerlist is synonymous for list of super peers.The local list is stored in the registry, under a username-seeded pseudo-randomly generated key in the HKEYCURRENTUSER hive. Virus PifThe algorithm changes across major variants, but seems unique across minor variantsimplementing the same protocol (defined later.) Figure 7 shows the local list location of an infected “Administra-tor” user. Figure 7 Local peerlist for an “Administrator” infected by a V4 variantPage 8.
Sality: Story of a peer-to-peer viral networkSecurity Response Transport and packet formatThe P2P protocol used by Sality is a custom, simple protocol. The transport takes place over UDP. The port usedis pseudo-randomly generated. The algorithm used to derive the port number is:Port = C + f(ComputerName)The constant C and the function f are implementation specific.For instance, one recent implementation was using:If (length(CompName) = 16,000,000.) The server willalso add this peer coordinates to its peerlist, making it readily available for Peer Exchange requests.Theserver will also set the goodcount of this new peer to 0. Else the Peer ID returned will either be 0 or a low value (. Embed Sality peer topeerviralnetwork. Security Response Sality: Story of a Peer- to-Peer Viral NetworkNicolas FallierePrincipal Software EngineerVersion 1.0 (July 2011)Executive SummaryW32.Sality is a file infector that spreads by infecting executable files andContentsby replicating itself across network shares.Infected hosts join a peer-Executive Summary.
1to-peer network used to propagate malware on the compromised com-Timeline. Typically, those additional programs will be used to relay spam,Architecture. 3proxy communications, steal private information, infect Web serversGoing peer-to-peer.
7.or achieve distributed computing tasks, such as password cracking.Review of the V3 network.11Review of the V4 network. 14The combination of file infection mechanism and the fully de-Metrics and Estimations. 15 centralized peer-to-peer network, along with other anti-secu-Conclusion.
18 rity measures, make Sality one of the most effective and re-Annex A. 19 silient malware in today’s threat landscape.Estimations showAnnex B. 20 that hundreds of thousands of machines are infected by Sality.This paper will give an overview of Sality and briefly describe the archi-tecture of the malware. The core of this paper focuses on the peer-to-peer characteristics of Sality, and examines its strengths and potentiallimitations.
Finally, I will describe current trends and metrics for Sality.Timeline2003-2004: Early versionsThe first public occurrence of Sality was recorded in June 2003.In theinitial versions, Sality infected executables by pre-pending its UPX-packed code to the host. The payload consisted of an informationstealing routine, to collect user-input data (via a keylogger DLL), pass-words stored in the registry and dial-up connection settings.The sto-len data was then emailed to the attacker, using various SMTP serverslocated in Russia.
An example of such an email can be seen in Figure 1. Sality: Story of a peer-to-peer viral networkSecurity ResponseFigure 1Exfiltration mail sent by Sality v2.93Page 2. Sality: Story of a peer-to-peer viral networkSecurity ResponseA few interesting elements are found in these early versions of the virus.First, the author did not adopt thequiet, stay-under-the-radar approach many malware creators have nowadays.
Second, the curious reader askingwhere the name “Sality” originated from now has the answer: it is derived from “Salavat City”, a Russian townfrom which the author may originate.This threat bears a couple of other names, also related to strings foundinside the payload: “Kuku” (which means Hide-and-Seek in Russian), or “Sector” (the nickname of the author).The simplicity of the early versions is expressed in at least three different areas. The file infector is basic compared to more advanced viruses.
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The virus and its payload form a whole entity. The author has no easy way to update it.
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The exfiltration method is also very basic, as the email addresses are hardcoded in the malware.2004-2008: Improving their creationBetween 2004 and 2008, the authors worked a lot to improve their creation. Detailing the many variants thatappeared during this period of time is not in the scope of this paper.More generally, however, theFigure 2infection technique changed asSality v3.09 contacting a C&C server (now sink-holed)the virus became polymorphicwith entry-point obscuringtechniques - making it moredifficult to detect and remedi-ate. The payload was separatedfrom the virus code, as the viruswould download additionalmalware referenced by URLshardcoded in the virus body.Version 3.09, active in 2006, isa good example of that change.It includes anti-security software routines to block or disable a few firewalls, utilities, or anti-virus programs. Itcontacts a HTTP server (www.h3ns1k.info, www.g1ikdcvns3sdsal.info, or www.f5ds1jkkk4d.info), which returnsan encoded list of malware to be executed. The author also decided to be more quiet, though a few references to“kuku” remain, such as in the user-agent, “KUKU v3.09 exp” in this case.2008-2011: Better distribution schemeSometime in 2008, maybe late 2007, the author decided to fix a major weakness in the distribution scheme: thehardcoded URLs to the payload.